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L. Introduction
Prosecutors have enormous discretion in the criminal justice system.'
They decide whether to proceed with a prosecution and then select the
charges filed against individuals accused of committing crimes.2 Their
discretion is heightened by the fact that there are over four thousand federal
criminal statutes.' Federal prosecutors also play a crucial role in the plea
bargaining process, 4 a method that resolves approximately ninety-five
*
LeRoy Highbaugh Sr. Research Chair and Professor of Law, Stetson University
School of Law. The author thanks Dean Darby Dickerson and Stetson University College of
Law for their research support. Also thanks go to Professor Erik Luna for providing a forumn
for discussion that motivated me to write this Article.
1. See Richard Bloom, ProsecutorialDiscretion, 87 GEO. L.J. 1267, 1267-7 1 (1999)
(discussing prosecutorial decisionmaking).
2. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985) (stating that absent an
impermissible standard such as race or religion, prosecutors have discretion to decide who
will be charged with a crime).
3. See John S. Baker, Jr., Measuring the Explosive Growth of Federal Crime
Legislation, CRIME REPORT (Federalist Soc'y for Law & Pub. Pol'y Studies), 2004, at 3
(noting that there are over four thousand offenses that carry criminal penalties in the United
States Code, which is a one-third increase since 1980); see also John S. Baker Jr.,
Jurisdictional and Separation of Powers Strategies to Limit the Expansion of Federal
Crimes, 54 Am. U. L. REv. 545, 548-54 (2005) (discussing the increasing number of federal
criminal statutes).

4.

See

WAYNE

R. LAFAVE

ET AL., 4 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

§ 13.2(a) (2d ed. 1999)

(discussing the range of discretionary decisions afforded to prosecutors); James Vorenberg,

Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power,

94 HARv. L. REv.
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1521, 1523-60 (1981)
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percent of the cases' in the federal criminal justice system. The role of
federal prosecutors in sentencing matters has varied over time,6 but here too
they have a significant role, as only prosecutors can offer a sentencing
reduction for cooperation.7 They also make sentencing recommendations to
the court' and select the initial charges against the accused that will
ultimately serve as the basis for sentencing once a conviction is obtained.

(describing the scope and limits of prosecutorial discretion and explaining why that
discretion is overbroad). See generally Fred C. Zacharias, Justice in Plea Bargaining, 39
Wm. & MARY L. REV.

1121 (1998) (discussing the plea bargaining process in the United

States).

5. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, GUILTY PLEAS AND TRIAL RATES, FISCAL YEARS
2005-2009 (Apr. 9, 2010), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2009/FigC.pdf
(presenting the percentages of cases resolved by plea bargaining in the federal criminal
justice system for the years 2006-2009 as follows-2006: 95.7%; 2007: 95.8 %; 2008:
96.3 %;2009: 96.3%). See generally Ellen S. Podgor, Pleading Blindly, 80 Miss. L.J. 4
(forthcoming 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.comlsol3/papers.cfin?abstract-id=
1672450 (discussing discovery for defendants prior to entering into plea agreements).
6. Whether the adoption of the federal sentencing guidelines has increased or
decreased prosecutorial power is uncertain. Some claim that prosecutors have increased
power with sentencing guidelines as they have the ability to charge-bargain prior to issuing
an indictment in order to control the sentence being given. See Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J.
Shuthofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical Study of Charging and Bargaining
Practices Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 501, 502 (1992)
(discussing how guidelines can decrease judicial discretion but increase prosecutorial ability
to charge-bargain). Following a litany of Supreme Court decisions, such as United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), federal sentencing guidelines have moved from being
mandatory to advisory. See Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and
the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420, 1476-96 (2008) (discussing how recent
decisions restore discretion to judges and prosecutors).
7. Prosecutors have the exclusive power to offer 5K1 .1 reductions under the federal
sentencing guidelines to those who cooperate. This motion asks the court to proceed in
giving an accused a below-guidelines range sentence for their "substantial assistance to the
government."

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

§ 5K1. 1 (2009). A 5K1.lI motion was

particularly significant in the pre-Booker days when the sentencing guidelines were
mandatory. This motion was one of very few ways that permitted courts to sentence outside
the sentencing grid provided by the federal guidelines. The 5K1 . motion carries less
significance now that the federal guidelines are advisory. A SKIA. motion can, however,
assure the defendant of support at sentencing from the prosecution. See Ellen S. Podgor, The
Ethics and Professionalism of Prosecutorsin DiscretionaryDecisions, 68 FORDHAM L. REV.
1511, 1523-25 (2000) (discussing the importance of SKiA. motions as part of prosecutorial
discretion).
8. See Robert L. Misner, Recasting ProsecutorialDiscretion, 86 J. CRim. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 716, 776 (1996) (stating that sentencing recommendations are among
prosecutors' many roles).
9. See Bloom, supra note 1, at 1268 (stating that choosing what charges to bring is
among the decisions within a prosecutor's discretion).
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THE TAINTED FEDERAL PROSECUTOR

Although the Constitution and federal statutes serve as limits, the
discretion afforded to prosecutors is huge.' 0 They are guided by internal
guidelines that provide advice on an array of substantive and procedural
matters."1 Ethically they serve as "minister[s] of justice"12 in enforcing
laws passed by Congress, as opposed to being mere advocates in the
criminal justice system.'13 And as federal employees they are non-political
4
once they commence their role with the Department of Justice (DOJ).'1
The reality, however, is that internal guidelines have no force at law' 5
and recently politics have improperly entered several areas within the DOJ.
Three recent joint reports issued by the DOJ's Office of Professional
Responsibility (OPR) and Office of Inspector General (OIG) provide ample
evidence of politicization in the DOJ. These reports, An Investigation of
Allegations of PoliticizedHiring by Monica Goodling and Other Staff in the
6
An Investigation of
Office of the Attorney General (Goodling Report),'1
Allegations of Politicized Hiring in the Department of Justice Honors
Program and Summer Law Intern Program (Honors Program/SLIP
7
and An Investigation of Allegations of Politicized Hiring and
Report),'1
Other Improper PersonnelActions in the Civil Rights Division (Civil Rights
10.

See

KENNJETH GULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE

188 (1969) (discussing the

breadth of prosecutorial discretion).
11. See Ellen S. Podgor, Department of Justice Guidelines: Balancing "Discretionary

Justice," 13

CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y

167, 170-75 (2004) [hereinafter Podgor,

Department of Justice] (discussing the history and status of federal guidelines in the
Department of Justice).

12.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT

R. 3.8 cmnt. (2009). States have adopted the

ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, albeit with modifications specific for that
jurisdiction.
13. See id. ("A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply
that of an advocate.").
14. See infra notes 29-32 and accompanying text (describing the extent to which DOJ
prosecutors are traditionally regarded as nonpolitical once in office).
15. See Podgor, supra note 11, at 175-77 (explaining the courts' unwillingness to
grant relief based solely on a violation of internal guidelines).

16.

See U.S. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN. & U.S. OFFICE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY,
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS Or POLITICIZED HIRING BY
MONICA GOODLING AND OTHER STAFF IN THE OFFICE OF THE ATroRNEY GENERAL 35-40
(2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/opr/goodling072408.pdf [hereinafter GOODLING

U.S.

REPORT]

(describing evidence of politicization in the hiring process in the DOJ).

See U.S. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN. & U.S. OFFICE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY,
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING IN THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE HONORS PROGRAM AND SUMMER LAW INTERN PROGRAM 98-102
17.

U.S.

(2008), available at http://wwwjustice.gov/opr/oig-opr-investigation-hire-slip.pdf [hereinafter
HONORS PRoGRAm~/SLIP REPORT] (describing evidence of politicized hiring in the DOI Honors
Program and Summer Law Intern Program).
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Report) 18 all provide a sharp contrast to the history and tradition of a
nonpolitical DOJ.19
Commentators and scholars have reflected on the infiltration of politics
into the justice system 20 with discussions that look at different solutions to the
problem,4 such as removal of the Senate confirmation process for U.S.
Attorneys, redefining the role of prosecutors in the federal system, and
"1restrictions on contact between U.S. Attorneys and political officials.4 1 Some
have called for the indictments of those who engaged in political activity.2
Others have focused on the "firings" of U.S. Attorneys in examining the
allocation of prosecutorial power.2
This Article looks at politicization in the DOJ from a different angle. It
focuses first on the importance of maintaining political neutrality in the DOJ 2.
18. See U.S. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN. & U.S. OFFICE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING AND
OTHER IMPROPER PERSONNEL ACTIONS IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION 64-65 (2008),
available at http://wwwjustice.gov/opr/oig-opr-iaph-crd.pdf [hereinafter CIVIL RIGHTS
REPORT] (concluding that political and ideological affiliations were considered in the hiring

and management of attorneys in the DOJ).
19. A fourth report on the "firings" of nine U.S. Attorneys is briefly mentioned in this
Article. See U.S. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN. & U.S. OFFICE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE REMOVAL OF NINE U.S. ATTORNEYS IN2006
356-58 (2008), available at http://wwwjustice.gov/opr/us-att-firings-rpt092308.pdf
[hereinafter REMOVAL OF NINE] (concluding that the DOJ fired an unprecedented number of
attorneys with inappropriate motives and inadequate oversight on the part of high level
officials).
20. See generally John McKay, Train Wreck at the Justice Department: An
Eyewitness Account, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 265 (2008) (discussing the "firings" of U.S.
Attorneys as written by one of the nine U.S. Attorneys involved); James K. Robinson,
Restoring Public Confidence in the Fairnessof the Department of Justice's CriminalJustice
Function, 2 HARv. L. & POL'y REv. 237 (2008) (discussing the politicization of the DOJ and
the need to restore credibility to this office).
21. Sara Sun Beale, Rethinking the Identity and Role of United States Attorneys, 6
OHIO ST. J. ChUm. L. 369, 416 (2009). Beale advocates for regulating contact between DOJ
and "political actors." Id at 435-38.
22. See Scott Horton, Another Audacious Whitewash at DOJ, HARPER'S MAG., July
22, 2010, http://www.harpers.org/archive/20l10/07hbc-9000743 1 (last visited Nov. 15,
2010) (criticizing the decision by the DOJ to not bring any criminal charges after its
investigation of the U.S. Attorneys firing scandal) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
23. See generally Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, "The US. Attorneys Scandal"
and the Allocation of Prosecutorial Power, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 187 (2008) (using three
hypothetical situations to discuss the "firings" of U.S. Attorneys and how prosecutorial
power should be distributed).
24. See infra notes 61-66 and accompanying text (discussing the emphasis
traditionally placed on the non-political nature of DOJ prosecutors).
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Overcriminalization 25 the breadth of many criminal statutes, 26 the increased
absence of mens rea requirements in criminal offenses 27 and the ability of
prosecutors to use "short-cut" offenses to proceed with charges with
relatively little proof 2 8 raise concerns when the individuals making the
decisions may appear biased. Instead of focusing only on ways to alleviate
politicization in the federal criminal justice system, the focus also needs to
be on examining structural changes in the DOJ that will minimize the
ability to have decisions that might be politicized or might suggest an
appearance of being politicized. Conquering systemic problems accruing
from an overcriminalized system will assure that decision-making is
consistent and not a product of a prosecutor's personal preferences. Thus,
even if politicization should again enter into the DOJ, limited power in
decision-making would avoid any possible problems that might accrue from
the appearance or reality of having politically connected decisionmakers.
HI. Politics in the DOJ
It is hard to say that politics has no role in the DOJ. After all, the
Attorney General is appointed by the President, who ran for political office.
Additionally, the U.S. Attorneys that serve in the ninety-three offices across
the United States 29 are appointed to their positions by the President, and all
So it is clear that their initial
face a legislative confirmation process.3

25. See infra notes 67-76 and accompanying text (describing the rapid growth of
federal criminal statutes in recent years).
26. See infra notes 77-84 and accompanying text (discussing the breadth of federal
criminal statutes)
27. See infra notes 90-94 and accompanying text (describing the decreasing mens rea
requirements of federal crimes).
28. See infra notes 85-89 and accompanying text (describing the practice of and
growing opportunities for prosecutors to charge lesser-but easier to prove-offenses in
many instances).
29. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, United States Attorneys' Mission Statement,
http://wwwjustice.gov/usao/offices/mission.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2010) (explaining
that the ninety-three U.S. Attorneys, in offices "throughout the United States, Puerto Rico,
the Virgin Islands, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands. . . are appointed by, and serve
at the discretion of, the President of the United States, with advice and consent of the United
States Senate") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). "The United States
Attorneys serve as the nation's principal litigators under the direction of the Attorney
General." id
30. See 28 U.S.C. § 541 (2006) (stating the provisions for appointment and
confirmation of the U.S. Attorneys). 28 U.S.C. § 541 provides:
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selection results from the acts of individuals involved in the political
31
process.
Many have noted, however, that once in office, U.S. Attorneys
are considered to be non-political.3
Even though there is a political component to the selection and
retention of the Attorney General and U.S. Attorneys, the same cannot be
said for non-political appointees who serve as Assistant U.S. Attorneys or
participate in the Department's Summer Honors Program.
These
individuals are non-political appointees and serve in roles that are supposed
to be immune from political consequences.3
As career civil servants
working in the criminal division, they are controlled by the Hatch Act, 35 in
the further restricted category that precludes engaging "in partisan political
36
management or partisan political campaigns.
Despite these restrictions on politics, three OPRIOIG investigations
produced reports that demonstrate the infiltration of politics into DOj.37 A
fourth report, pertaining to allegations of politics in what has been termed
(a) The President shall appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, a United States attorney for each judicial district.
(b) Each United States attorney shall be appointed for a term of four years. On
the expiration of his term, a United States attorney shall continue to perform the
duties of his office until his successor is appointed and qualifies.
(c) Each United States attorney is subject to removal by the President.
Id.
31. See Beale, supra note 21, at 370-71 (describing the broad power of certain
individuals in hiring prosecutors).
32. See, e.g., id. at 370 (stating that DOJ prosecutors are expected to abandon political
and ideological leanings after starting a career at the DOJ); Bruce A. Green & Fred C.
Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004 Wis. L. REv. 837, 837-52 (2004) (discussing
prosecutorial neutrality generally).
33. See generally James Eisenstein, The U.S. Attorney Firings of 2006: Main
Justice'~s Centralization Efforts in Historical Context, 31 SEAT-rLE U. L. REv. 219 (2008)
(providing historical commentary on the role of politics in the appointment process of U.S.
Attorneys).
34. See id. at 227-28 (noting a broad consensus that DOJ prosecutors should conduct
their work in a manner divorced from partisanship and ideology).
35. See Hatch Act of 1939, 5 U.S.C. § 1501 (2006) (prohibiting civil servants from
engaging in partisan political activities); see also U.S. Office of Special Counsel, About the
Hatch Act FederalEmployees, http://www.osc.govlhatchact.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2010)
(providing general information regarding Hatch Act federal employees) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
36. U.S. Office of Special Counsel, Further Restricted Employees-Political
Restrictions, http://www.osc.gov/haFederatFurtherRestrisctionandActivities.htm (last visited
Nov. 15, 20 10) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
37. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text (describing three investigative
reports discussing politicization at the DOJ).
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the "firings" of nine U.S. Attorneys, also resulted in an OPR'OIG
investigation.3
In. this case, a career prosecutor was appointed to
investigate whether criminal charges should be filed as a result of activities
surrounding the "firings" of these U.S. Attorneys .39 A July 21, 2010 letter
from Assistant Attorney General Ronald Weich to Representative John
Conyers, Jr., chair of the Judiciary Committee, found that criminal charges
were not warranted .40 The letter did state that "[t]he Attorney General
remains deeply dismayed by the OIG/OPR findings related to politicization.
of the Department's actions, and has taken steps to ensure those mistakes
41
will not be repeated.,

A June 24, 2008 OIG/OPR report, the Honors Program/SLIPReport,
examined hiring in the "highly competitive hiring program for entry-level
attorneys ,2at th
O. The investigation covered the years 2002-2006
and focused on whether "political or ideological affiliations" entered into
hiring decisions. 3 The investigation elicited evidence of politicization in
the Department, namely, "that political or ideological affiliations were used
to deselect candidates from the Honors Program and SLIP.""4 It noted how
the process had changed in 2002 when the Attorney General's Working
Group set up "a Screening Committee composed primarily of politically
appointed employees firomn the Department's leadership offices," 5 which
approved individuals for the Honors Program and SLIP.4 Although there
were no political deselections found for the years 2003-2005, in 2006,
problems can be seen.4 Changes were eventually made in 2007, including
38. See REmovAL OF NINE, supra note 19, at 1-4 (describing the investigation of the
removal of nine U.S. Attorneys).
39. See id. at 356-58 (discussing whether the impropriety of the attorneys' removal
rose to the level of crime).
40. See Letter of Ronald Weich, Assistant Attorney General, to Hon. John Conyers,
Jr., Chair, Committee on the Judiciary 5-6 (July 21, 2010), available at
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/assistant-ag-ronald-weichs-letter.pdf (concluding that
criminal charges were not warranted based on the results of the investigation).
4 1. Idat 6.
42. HONORS PROGRAt.MSLIP REPORT, supra note 17, at 1.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 92. The report describes detailed findings with respect to individuals
working in DOJ, finding some using improper criteria and others not. Id at 98-102.
45. Id at 98.
46. See id (describing the selection process for the DOJ Honors Program and SLIP).
47. See id ("[W]e found that in 2006 the Screening Committee used political and
ideological considerations to deselect many candidates.
We determined that a
disproportionate number of the deselected Honors Program and SLIP candidates had liberal
affiliations as compared to the candidates with conservative affiliations.").
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a memorandum issued by Attorney General Mukasey "requiring all political
appointees to acknowledge that they have read the Department regulations
that hiring must be merit based and that political affiliations cannot be

considered."0

8

A July 2, 2008 OIG/OPR report, the Civil Rights Report, looked at
"allegations that political or ideological affiliations were considered in
hiring, transferring, and assigning cases to career attorneys in the Civil
Rights Division" of the Doj.49 Included as part of this investigation was
"whether the Division' s senior management failed to recognize and correct
any improper consideration of political or ideological affiliations in the
hiring and treatment of career attorneys."0 0 As with the prior reports, the
findings demonstrated politicization in the office."' Specifically, one of the
findings was that "the Civil Rights Division improperly used political or
ideological affiliations in assessing applicants for career attorney positions,
including hiring for both experienced attorneys and entry-level attorneys
through the Honors Program."5 2 The report also found that "political or
ideological affiliations resulted in other personnel actions that affected
career attorneys in the Division, such as attorney transfers and attorney case
53

assignments."

An additional report issued by OIG/OPR, the GoodlingReport, looked
at specific persons within DOJ, most notably Monica Goodling, to
determine whether there was truth to allegations "that in 2006 several
United States Attorneys were forced to resign for improper reasons,
including improper political purposes."04 The investigation also examined
whether "Goodling inappropriately used political or ideological affiliations
in the hiring process for career Department employees." 55 This report, like
It included as a finding that
the others, found political improprieties.5
"Goodling improperly subjected candidates for certain career positions to

48. Idatl101.
49. CiviL RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 18, at 1.
50. Id
5 1. See Ad at 64 (concluding that ideological and political factors were considered in
hiring and other management decisions at the DOJ).
52. Id
53. Id
54. GOODLING REPORT, supra note 16, at 1.
55. Id
56. See id at 135 (finding evidence of discrimination in hiring for career positions on
the basis of political affiliations at the DOJ).
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the same politically based evaluation she used on candidates for political
positions, in violation of federal law and Department policy.""7
Each of these three reports recommends changes to correct problems
and to assure that improper political decisions will not occur in the future.
For example, in the Honors Program/SLIP Report, one of the
recommendations is to strengthen "the briefing currently provided to
political appointees about the merit system principles."5 The Civil Rights
Report recommends that "the Department consider issuing periodic
statements to all employees about what constitutes prohibited personnel
practices under federal law, regulations, and Department policy."5 9 Finally,
the Goodling Report states as one of the recommended changes "that the
Department clarify its policies regarding the use of political or ideological
affiliations to select career attorney candidates for temporary details within
60
the Department.",

The transparency following discovery of politicization in DOJ will
certainly serve to avoid repetition of this conduct. The fact that OIG and
OPR did four separate reports on various aspects of the entry of politics into
DOJ will also serve as a deterrent. It remains to be seen whether
punishment or additional repercussions, such as criminal charges, will come
from review of individuals' conduct within the DOJ. It also remains to be
seen whether new measures put into place, such as additional training, will
provide security that these events will not happen again. But certainty of no
further transgressions, of course, can never be guaranteed.
III. Importance of PoliticalNeutrality in DOJ
Federal prosecutors serve in a unique enforcement role in the criminal
justice system. In many instances, like drug and immigration prosecutions,
the cases are prepared and brought to them by federal agencies such as the
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)6 or Immigration and Customs

Id.
HONORS PROGRAM/SLIP REPORT, supra note 17, at 102.
59. CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 18, at 65.
60. GOODLING REPORT, supra note 16, at 139.
61. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, http://www.
justice.gov/jmd/mps/manual/dea.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2010) (stating that the mission of
the DEA is "to enforce the controlled substances laws and regulations of the United States'
and to "bring [drug organizations] to the criminal and civil justice systems of the United
States") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
57.

58.
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Enforcement (ICE).6 The agencies investigate the crimes and perpetrators
and then proceed to the DOJ's Criminal Division in order to proceed with a
prosecution. 3 Agency involvement may be more closely aligned with the
investigation in white-collar matters, where the grand jury may be
examining documents to determine whether to issue an indictment. 6
Whether it is a street crime or white-collar case in this process, federal
prosecutors have a wealth of criminal statutes to consider and many tools
within their arsenal in determining whether to use their discretionary power
In addition to the constantly increasing
to proceed with a prosecution.6
number of applicable statutes, the breadth of many federal criminal statutes
and the lack of mens rea or reduced mens rea in some of these statutes
afford prosecutors significant power in their prosecution role.6
There are over four thousand criminal statutes that can be used by
These statutes are scattered throughout the United States
prosecutors.6
Code as opposed to being limited to the criminal code. One finds criminal
statutes in tax,'6 securities,'6 environmental, 70 health, 7 '1and an array of other
places in the United States Code.7 The failure to have a single location for
62. See U.S. Dep't of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ICE Mission Statement,
http://www.ice.gov/about/index.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2010) ("ICE's primary mission is
to protect national security, public safety and the integrity of the U.S. borders through the
criminal and civil enforcement of federal laws governing border control, customs, trade and
immigration.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
63. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, About the Division, http://wwwjustice.
gov/criminallabout (last visited on Nov. 15, 2010) ("The Criminal Division develops,
enforces, and supervises the application of all federal criminal laws except those specifically
assigned to other divisions.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
64. See Kenneth 1. Schacter & Donald K. Stem, Tough Law Enforcement Techniques
Come to White-Collar Investigations, N.Y. L.J., July 7, 2003, at 8 (describing the close
relationship between investigators and prosecution in white-collar cases).
65. See infra notes 67-76 (discussing the number of federal criminal statutes).
66. See infra notes 90-94 (discussing mens rea requirements of certain federal
statutes).
67. Baker, supra note 3, at 546.
68. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (2006) (creating criminal penalties for tax evasion); id
§ 7203 (creating criminal penalties for the failure to file taxes); id. § 7206 (creating criminal
penalties for the filing or aiding and assisting in the filing of a false tax return).
69. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77 (2006) (creating criminal penalties for willful violations
of the Securities Act of 1933).
70. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 401 (2006) (creating criminal penalties for violations of the
Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1989); id. § 1251 et. seq. (creating criminal
penalties for violations of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act).
71. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (2006) (creating criminal penalties for health care
fraud).
72. One finds crimes related to banking in Title 31, such as crimes related to the filing
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all criminal statutes is intensified by the enormous number of available
statutes that can be used by federal prosecutors. In 1998, the American Bar
Association appointed a task force to examine the increased number of
73
federal statutes and issued a report, The Federalization of Criminal Law.
The task force was chaired by Edwin Meese, III and William W. Taylor,
74
11,
and the report stressed the "dramatic increase in the number and
variety of federal crimes."7 5 The report notes that "of all federal crimes
enacted since 1865, over forty percent [were] created since 197. 076
In addition to the number of federal statutes, prosecutorial discretion is
heightened by the breadth of many statutes that allow a wide array of
conduct to be subject to criminal prosecution.
Prosecutors' broad
discretionary powers are not limited to deciding who will be charged with
criminal offenses and what charges will be brought. Many statutes allow a
wide array of conduct to be the subject of prosecution. For example, the
mail fraud statute allows prosecutors to proceed when there is a material
deprivation of money or property. 7 The mailing is no longer confined to
postal mailings and now includes an interstate carrier.7 A statute that was
originally focused on frauds on the Post Office 79 has become a statute that

of reports on foreign currency transactions. See 31 U.S.C. § 5315(c) (2006) ("The Secretary
of the Treasury shall prescribe regulations ... requiring reports on foreign currency
transactions conducted by a United States person.").
73. See THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, TASK FORCE ON THE FEDERALIZATION
OF CRIMINAL LAW, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, Am. BAR ASS'N 2 (James A. Strazzella rep.
1998) (addressing concern about the increasing number of new federal crimes).
74. Idat4.
75. Id at 2.
76. Id
77. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 4 (1999) (holding that materiality is an
essential element of a mail fraud prosecution); see also Ellen S. Podgor, Criminal Fraud,48
Am. U. L. R~v. 729, 751-54 (1999) (discussing what types of offenses are prosecuted under
the mail fraud statute); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Metastasis of Mail Fraud: The Continuing
Story of the "Evolution" of a White-Collar Crime, 21 Am. CRIM. L. Rev. 1, 2-3 (1983)
(discussing how the mail fraud charge is applied expansively); Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail
Fraudand the Intangible Rights Doctrine: Someone to Watch Over Us, 31 HARv. J. LEGIS.
153, 155 (1994) (discussing how federal prosecutors use mail fraud to prosecute political
corruption).
78. See Peter J. Henning, Maybe It Should Just Be Called Federal Fraud: The
Changing Nature of the Mail FraudStatute, 36 B.C. L. REv. 435, 437-40 (1995) (noting the
insignificance of the mailing aspect of the mail fraud statute).
79. Mail fraud emanates from an 1872 statute, and was one provision in a
recodification of the Postal Act. See led S. Rakoff, The FederalMail FraudStatute (PartI),
18 Duo. L. Rev. 771, 782 (1980) (discussing the history of the mail fraud statute).
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looks at frauds that might have a tangential connection to mailing.8 0 it is

now a fraud that just happens to use a mailing as one "step in the

plot.,,81

In

many instances, multiple statutes can be used to criminalize the same
criminal conduct.8 For example, two mail frauds that occur as part of a
pattern of racketeering activity may also result in a 1RICO charge,8 a statute
that carries a higher penalty than mail fraud. 84
Prosecutors often use short-cut offenses like perjury, 85 obstruction of
87
*
86
justice, or false statements, as it is relatively easy to prosecute these
offenses .88 This is particularly true in large document driven white-collar
cases where a conviction can be obtained more easily by proceeding under
a statute that requires significantly less proof than might be necessary to
show an accounting fraud.8
Many federal statutes do not require a mens rea element or have very
low levels of mens rea required. 90 A recent report of the National
80. See Ellen S. Podgor, Mail Fraud: Opening Letters, 43 S.C. L. REV. 223, 224
(1992) [hereinafter Podgor, Mail Fraud] ("[Tihe emphasis of the offense has shifted,
drastically reducing the focus on the use of the postal system.").
8 1. Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 394 (1916). In Badders v. United States,
the Supreme Court found that mailing of letters in execution of a scheme to defraud could be
made a criminal offense, if criminal intent was present. Id.
82. See generally Ellen S. Podgor, Tax Fraud-MailFraud: Synonymous, Cumulative
or Diverse?, 57 U. GiN. L. Rrv. 903 (1989) (discussing the overlap between mail fraud and
tax fraud).
83. See Podgor, Mail Fraud, supra note 80, at 263 (explaining that RICO requires the
commission of two or more predicate acts, which may include mail and wire fraud).
84. See id. at 265 (noting how RICO sentences can be more severe than mail fraud
sentences).
85. See 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2006) (creating criminal penalties for lying under oath).
86. See id. § 1503 (creating criminal penalties for attempting to influence or intimidate
a juror or officer of the court). There are many other obstruction of justice statutes that are
used by the government. See id. § 1505 (creating criminal penalties for obstruction of
proceedings before departments, agencies, and committees); id § 1512 (creating criminal
penalties for tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant).
87. See id § 1001 (creating criminal penalties for making false statements within the
jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the federal government).
88. See Ellen S. Podgor, Arthur Andersen, LLP and Martha Stewart: Should
MaterialityBe an Element of Obstruction of Justice?, 44 WAsHBuRI4 L.J. 583, 601 (2005)
(noting that in certain cases "prosecutors proceeded with obstruction charges that allowed
them to obtain convictions without the need to further investigate or prosecute the
underlying conduct that they were originally pursuing").
89. See, e.g., Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 702 (2005)
(explaining the government's charge of obstruction of justice against Arthur Anderson for
allegedly shredding documents, as opposed to charging accounting fraud).
90. See, e.g., United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1039 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding
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Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) and the Heritage
Foundation, Without Intent: How Congress Is Eroding the Criminal Intent
Requirement in Federal Criminal Law, 9 ' noted that "offenses with
inadequate mens rea requirements are ubiquitous at all stages of the
legislative process."0 2 This study focused on non-violent offenses in a two-year
congressional period.93 The authors concluded that "[o]ver 57 percent of the
offenses introduced, and 64 percent of those enacted into law, contained
inadequate mens rea requirements, putting the innocent at risk of criminal

punishment."9

4

Oftentimes internal guidelines in the DOJ serve as a check on
prosecutorial discretion. These guidelines, found in the U.S. Attorneys
Manual, provide guidance, especially to new attorneys, as well as those who
have been in the Department for lengthy periods of time. 95 Unfortunately,
however, these are merely guidelines and cannot be relied upon to check
prosecutorial discretion in all cases. In addition to the guidelines stating that
they are solely for internal use, courts have continually held that they are
unenforceable at law by third parties.9 Despite clear failures to abide by DOJ
guidelines, it is seldom that a court will use its supervisory powers to rectify the
situation.9

that knowledge that a permit had not been obtained was not needed for criminal penalties
under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act); United States v. White Fuel Corp., 498
F.2d 619, 622 (1 st Cir. 1974) (finding that the Refuse Act did not require a mens rea); see
also Stuart P. Green, Why It's A Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress: Overcriminalization
and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533, 1541 (1997)
(discussing when "moral content" justifies criminal punishment).
91. BIAN W. WALSH & TIFFANY M. JOSLYN, WITHOUT INTENT: How CONGRESS IS
ERODING THE CRIMINAL INTENT REQUIREMENT IN FEDERAL LAW (2010), available at
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/20 10/05/Without-Intent
(describing
the
decreasing number of federal statutes that have a mens rea requirement).
92. Id.at x.
93. See id. ("The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and The Heritage
Foundation jointly under-took an unprecedented look at the federal legislative process for all
studied non-violent criminal offenses introduced in the 109th Congress in 2005 and 2006.").
94. Id.
95. See Norman Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial
Discretion, 19 UCLA L. REv. 1, 57 (1971) (discussing the benefits of having DOJ
guidelines).
96. See Podgor, Department of Justice, supra note 11, at 191 ("[Mlost decisions
maintain that internal policies of the Department of Justice are unenforceable at law.").
97. See id. at 189-94 (noting that most courts maintain that internal policies of the
Department of Justice are unenforceable at law and therefore do not rectify DOJ actions that
fall outside of the DOJ's internal guidelines).

18267 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1569 (2010)

1582

Political neutrality is particularly important in the DOJ because of the
enormous power provided to federal prosecutors. 98 It is also important from
Irrespective of whether
both a rhetorical and symbolic perspective. 99
the possibility or
reasons,
for
political
their
power
prosecutors actually abuse
appearance that this might occur taints the criminal justice system.
IV ModeratedDiscretion
Prosecutors have recently issued a harsh statement to the U.S. Sentencing
Commission, calling for review of certain cases and judicial actions because
the judges did not conform to the lines drawn by the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines. 00 Concerned about "trust and confidence" in the criminal justice
system, Jonathan J. Wroblewski, Director of Policy and Legislation, wrote in a
letter' 0 ' to the U.S. Sentencing Commission that "[tlo the extent that federal
sentencing is an ongoing source of discord, disunity, and criticism, the
reputation of the federal courts will be seriously damaged and the effectiveness
02
of the federal criminal justice will be compromised."1
But is the DOJ willing to have the same uniformity imposed upon them in
their decision-making process as they call for the Sentencing Commission to
have for judges? Strict sentencing guidelines fail to account for the individual
in determining the amount of time and money that should be the appropriate
punishment. Likewise, prosecutors need some discretion in selecting charges
to use against a defendant. Mere violation of a statute fails to account for the
individual circumstances that may warrant a lesser-included offense, a deferred
prosecution, or no prosecution. We are not a system of mathematical formulas
or computerized charging. It is always important to remember that both
98. See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text (discussing the powers and
importance of federal prosecutors).
99. See Kenneth B. Nunn, The Trial as Text: Allegory, Myth and Symbol in the
Adversarial Criminal Process-A Critique of the Role of the Public Defender and a
CRnIM.
Proposalfor Reform, 32 Amv.

L. REv.

743, 784-89 (1995) (discussing the symbolic

role of players in the criminal justice system).
100. See Marcia Coyle, Justice Department Calls for Probe of Federal Sentencing
Patterns, NAT'L LIJ., July 19, 2010, at 21 (reporting that the DOJ is concerned that "widely
disparate sentences don't make sense, ignore federal sentencing guidelines and are a sign of
a potentially very big problem").
101. See Letter of Jonathan J. Wroblewski, Director of Policy and Legislation, Criminal
Division, Department of Justice, to Hon. William K. Sessions III (June 28, 2010), available
(suggesting
at http://sentencing.typepad.com/files/annual-letter_2010_final-062810.pdf
changes to the Sentencing Guidelines).
102. Id. at 2.
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sentencing and charging involves real people, from the perpetrators of crimes,
to their families, and to the victims of these crimes.
Just as judges need some discretion in sentencing, so too do prosecutors in
their charging capacity. It is not advocated here that prosecutors should have
all discretion removed, as discretion clearly serves an important role in
achieving goals of restorative justice and rehabilitation. But realigning
criminal statutes and tailoring overly broad statutes could offer a moderated
discretion to the current system. Removal of repetitive statutes and statutes that
allow for haphazard application also offers consistency within the system.
The House of Representatives recently passed the National Criminal
Justice Commission Act of 2010,'03 and it is conceivable that the Senate will
move in a similar direction.'04 This Commission would provide a perfect home
for examining overcriminalization and remedies that might alleviate potential
There have been
future occurrences that could taint prosecutors.1'0
unsuccessful movements in the past, including the Brown Commnission,16 that
looked to redesign the federal criminal justice system.1 07 But starting with a

103. See H.R. 5143, 111th Cong. (2010) (creating a commission to review the U.S.
criminal justice system). The Act would allow for the creation of a "blue-ribbon bi-partisan
commission charged with undertaking an 18-month comprehensive review of the nation's
criminal justice system." Press Release, Congressman Bill Delahunt, House Passes National
Criminal Justice Commission Act (July 27, 20 10), http://delahunt.house.gov/2010/07/housepasses-national-criminal-justice-commission-act.shtmIn (last visited Nov. 15, 2010) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review), In addition to the "comprehensive review of the
criminal justice system," the commission is also charged to "make a reform recommendation
for the President, Congress, State, local, and tribal governments." H.R. 5143, 111Ith Cong.
(2010).
104. Presently under consideration is Senate Bill 714. This bill has comparable
language to the House bill that created a Criminal Justice Commission Act, but to date it has
not passed. See S. 714, 111th Cong. (2010) (creating a commission to undertake a
comprehensive review of all areas of the criminal justice system).
105. The aim of the Commission is to "undertake a comprehensive review of the
criminal justice system." H.R. 5143, 111Ith Cong. § 2 (2010). The last comprehensive study
was in 1965, when the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration
and Justice studied criminal justice and produced a written report, The Challenge of Crime in
a Free Society. Id. The report provided "200 specific recommendations on all aspects of the
criminal justice system involving Federal, State, tribal, and local governments, civic
organizations, religious institutions, business groups, and individual citizens." Id.
106. See NATIONAL Cotmum ssioN ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAws, FINAL
A PROPOSED NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE (1971), http://wings.buffalo.
REPORT:
edullawlbclc/codein.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2010) (proposing a new federal criminal
code) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Ronald L. Gainer,
Federal Criminal Code Reform: Pastand Future, 2 BUFF. CRim. L. REv. 45, 140-52 (1998)
(discussing the challenges to federal criminal reform work).
107. See generally Paul H. Robinson & Marcus D. Dubber, The American Model Penal
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foundation that has a legislative impetus provides a stronger likelihood for its
eventual passage.
V Conclusion
Others have called for internal and external efforts to restrict politicization
in the office.1 08 And although we have not seen a repeated occurrence of
political hiring, the real problem continues-the extraordinary power of
prosecutors. As long as prosecutors have over four thousand criminal statutes
that they can use in charging criminal conduct, and as long as prosecutors have
close to unbridled discretion in ninety-five percent of the cases--those settled
via the plea bargaining process-te problems of the past can be repeated. 09
A change in Attorney General, albeit not a change in political party,1
was a key impetus here in reviewing the politicization that had occurred in
DOJ."0 Absent this transparency, it is uncertain as to the length of time it
would have taken for the public to become aware of problems within the DOJ.
With the current check on prosecutorial misconduct minimized as a result of a
diminishing press," 1 ' oversight is weakened."12 But improvement to our
CRim%. L. REv. 319 (2007) (discussing reform of criminal
law).
108. See Beale, supra note 2 1, at 435 (arguing for scrutiny of the contacts between the
U.S. Attorneys and various political actors).
109. Attorney General Mukasey, appointed Attorney General by Republican George W.
Bush, was influential in mandating that politics be removed from the DOJ. See Press
Release, Dep't of Justice, Statement by Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey on Report
Issued by the Office of Professional Responsibility and Inspector General on the
Investigation of Allegations of Politicized Hiring by Monica Goodling and Other Staff in the
Office of the Attorney General (July 28, 2008), http://wwwjustice.gov/opa/pr/2008/July/08opa-658.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2010) (stating that it is improper and unacceptable to use
political considerations in DOJ hiring) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
110. See supra notes 29-60 and accompanying text (discussing the influence of politics
in the DOJ).
1 11. See, e.g., Richard Hine, Recession Will Hit Newspapers Hardest, GERSON

Code: A Brief Overview, 10 NEW

LEHRMAN GROUP NEWS

(Feb. 19, 2008), http://www.glgroup.com/News/Recession-Will-Hit-

Newspapers-Hardest-2 1861.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2010) (discussing how newspapers
have been affected by the economy) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
112. See Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse, & Luigi Zingales, Who Blows the Whistle on
Corporate Fraud? 2 1-23 (Univ. of Chi. Booth Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 08-22,
2008), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfmn?abstract -id=89 1482 (discussing
who exposes corporate fraud, including the role of journalists); see also Ellen S. Podgor,
White Collar Crime and the Recession: Was the Chicken or Egg First? (forthcoming 2010)
(discussing the role of the demise of the press on providing transparency in detecting white
collar crimes).
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criminal justice system should not merely be through increased oversight of
politics in the DOJ but also through examination of the structural foundation
that allows improper conduct to thrive.
Finding the appropriate balance in discretionary decisions is important.
Having a system that imposes few boundaries, fails to allow enforcement of
internal guidelines, and has no legal oversight is a system that can become the
subject of political whims of a prosecutor. But it is also important to have a
system that allows for adjustment of individual factors to assure that charging,
plea bargaining, sentencing, and other criminal justice decisions are decisions
that correlate to the individual person that is being processed in the criminal
justice system.

